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I. INTRODUCTION

When courts and commentators consider charitable enforcement
reform, common law traditions and the exclusivity of attorney general
enforcement stand as obstacles to hinder innovation and experimentation.
While many decry the history and tradition that created the contemporary
role of the attorney general, too few seem to appreciate its origins.' When
the history is examined, however, it is apparent that the law of charitable
enforcement has been fluid and malleable in responding to the needs and
vagaries of society over time. In short, the traditional common law role of
the attorney general is not so fixed and formidable as to preclude
charitable enforcement reform.
The purpose of this article is threefold: (1) to interject history into the

I. See infra notes 263-276 and accompanying text.
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charitable enforcement reform debate, (2) to evaluate proposed reforms in
a historical context, and (3) to educate the public and the practicing bar on
the origins of the modem role of the attorney general. 2 Frequently,
contemporary commentators on charitable enforcement tend to mention its
history, particularly the Statute of Elizabeth, in a perfunctory and cursory
manner. Having dutifully raised the ancient origins of modem charitable
enforcement, these commentators proceed to critique the current
enforcement regime and its central actor - the state attorney general. The
history of charitable enforcement, however, demands a more thorough
examination because of the lessons that it imparts to the current reform
debate. The problems that faced the chancery courts of fifteenth century
England are similar to the problems faced by modem regulators of nonprofit corporations.4 Thus, the contemporary debate over charitable
enforcement reform is well informed by the lessons of the past.
This article examines the historical basis for charitable enforcement by
the attorney general, paying particular attention to the American
experience. Section II describes the early development of charitable
enforcement in England from the thirteenth century until the American
Revolution. Section III discusses early American judicial treatment of
charities and the emergence of a restrictive view toward philanthropy. This
section begins with the first of three watershed cases, Trustees of the
PhiladelphiaBaptist Ass "nv. Hart'sExecutors,5 which indelibly shaped
the American law of charity. Section IV describes the ultimate acceptance
of a more permissive view toward charities resulting from Vidal v.
Girard.6 Section V discusses Trustees ofDartmouthCollege v. Woodward7
and the coming of age of charitable enforcement law in the United States.
Section VI explores the contemporary arguments both for and against
attorney general enforcement of charitable trusts. Section VII discusses
2. As to this third point, I must defer to the experiences of my colleagues in the charitable
enforcement sections of the various state attorney general offices. When charitable enforcement
issues arise, many private sector practitioners seem to regard the state attorney general as an
unwelcome and meddlesome interloper. Much of this resistance results, no doubt, from an
excusable ignorance on the part of many corporate practitioners regarding the history, tradition, and
implications of charitable trust law. As this article will attempt to clarify, however, the attorney
general's involvement in charitable enforcement is steeped in centuries of legal tradition.
3. See, e.g., Mary Francis Budig et al., Pledges to Nonprofit Organizations:Are They
Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced, 27 U.S.F.L. REv. 47 (1992).
4. Compare Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, with Daloia v. Franciscan Health System
of Central Ohio, Inc. 679 N.E.2d 1084 (Ohio 1997). (The Preamble states: "Whiche [charitable
assets) nevertheless have not byn imployed accordinge to the charitable intente of the givers and
founders thereof, by reason of Fraudes breaches of Truste and Negligence in those that shoulde pay
delyver and imploy the same.").
5. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1 (1819).
6. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
7. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
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some of the more noteworthy alternatives to attorney general enforcement.
Finally, Section VIII addresses impediments to proposed innovations and
the role of history in judicial and legislative reforms.
II. CHARITABLE ENFORCEMENT IN ENGLAND FROM THE
THIRTEENTH CENTURY TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

A. Early Charitiesand the EcclesiasticalCourts
The earliest charities began in Egypt during the time of the pharaohs.'
Charities were also known in the ancient Greek and Roman worlds. 9 One
of the earliest Western laws affecting charity was enacted around 150
B.C.E. when "Roman law extended the legal heir concept to associations
... thus giving the charitable associations the same legal status as the
natural heir. .. ."'0 Charitable organizations in the British Isles pre-date
the existence of the English nation. " In medieval England, charitable gifts
typically involved conveyances of land held in frankalmoign by religious
organizations. 2 While some conveyances of land to the church required
quid pro quo services, "other gifts of land ... might exact no precise
spiritual service, but were given for general spiritual benefit, and for which
no fealty was required; these tenures were known as frankalmoign, or free
alms."' 13 Property held in frankalmoign was exempt from the usual feudal
8. See EDITH L. FISCH et al., Charities and Charitable Foundations § 17, at 8 (1974). See
generally PHILANTHROPY INTHE WORLD'S TRADITIONS (Warren F. Ilchman et al. eds., 1998).
9. See Mary K. Lundwall, Inconsistency and Uncertainty in the CharitablePurposes
Doctrine, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1341, 1345-46 (1994) (discussing the English ecclesiastical courts's
incorporation of Roman charitable legal concepts into English law); see also FISCH ET AL., supra
note 8, §18, at 18.
10. FISCH ETAL, supra note 8, § 18, at 18.
'11. See id. § 19, at 11. FISCH ET AL explain:
The Anglo-Saxon history of charities largely concerns the struggle between
church and state. The English church was organized in Britain in 664 by Theodore
of Tarsus before England existed as a state. During the time of the Saxons, there
were many ecclesiastical organizations. Land was freely alienable to religious
organizations and ecclesiastical institutions could take and hold property without
limit.

Id.
12. See 4A WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS [formerly SCOTT ON
TRUSTS] § 348.2, 27 (4th ed. 1989); see also Lundwall, supra note 9, at 1345-46 (discussing the
historical background of charitable trusts from Roman development through early English law). See
generally 4A WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (1956) (providing a
comprehensive treatment of English legal history).
13. 1 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION § 4.05(b)(3)(xii), at 147 (David A.
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incidents that were associated with secular, non-charitable tenures. 14
Because of this, feudal lords were denied the usual benefits of property
once religious corporations obtained land through charitable gifts." In
response, forfeiture and mortmain statutes were enacted which "provid[ed]
that lands held by religious bodies should be forfeited to the overlord[,]16
and if he failed to enter, then to his overlord, and finally to the Crown.'
To defeat these mortmain and forfeiture statutes, religious charities
quickly found a loophole by which property was conveyed to individuals
for use by a religious order. 17 By the 1390s, however, the mortmain
statutes were expanded to include conveyances to individuals, and the
loophole was closed.'"
Despite chronic sparring between the church and the Crown, English
charity in the thirteenth century was principally a vehicle for the spiritual
redemption of the soul.' 9 Ecclesiastical courts enjoyed jurisdiction over
charitable enforcement as a result of the theological character of
philanthropy.2 ° By the thirteenth century, jurisdiction over the probate of
personalty became the exclusive province of the ecclesiastical courts.2 '
This jurisdiction sprang from the bishop's power to enforce charitable
bequests.22 At the start of the fifteenth century, however, ecclesiastical

Thomas ed., 1994).
14. See id. § 5.02(c), at 206-07. Feudal incidents were roughly equivalent to modem taxation.
See id.In the feudal system, secular tenants paid rent to their landlords in the form of goods and
services, such as crops or supplying the army with soldiers. See id. (discussing the incidents of
military tenures including homage, wardship, marriage, aids, and relief). Religious organizations
holding lands in frankalmoign were exempt from such obligations. See id.
15. See FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 348.2, at 27.
16. Id. (describing various mortmain statutes enacted during the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries).
17. See id., § 348.2, at 28 (describing the exploitation of this loophole by the Franciscan
Order during the thirteenth century).
18. See id. (discussing the expansion of the mortmain statutes under Stat. 15 Rich. II, c.5
(1391)).
19. See Note, The Enforcementof CharitableTrusts in America:A HistoryofEvolving Social
Attitudes, 54 VA. L. REV. 436, 438 (1968); see also FISCH FT AL., supra note 8,§ 19, at 15 ("Aid
to the poor and unfortunate became not an end in itself but an effective means of saving the soul
under the Augustinian doctrine that 'alms have power to extinguish and expiate sin."'); Lundwall,
supra note 9, at 1345-46 ("Part of the popularity for charitable giving came, no doubt, from the
belief that gifts to the church were an effective way to atone for sins and attain salvation.").
20. See GARETH JONES, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CHARITY 1532-1827 3, 5 (1969); see also
J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 146-54 (3d ed. 1990) (discussing
ecclesiastical courts); ALAN HARDING, THE LAW COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND (1973)

(discussing the early history of English courts from the ninth century through the thirteenth
century).
21. See JONES, supra note 20, at.4 n.7.
22. See id.
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courts earned a reputation for corruption and ineffectiveness.23 In response,
aggrieved beneficiaries increasingly sought relief for charitable
enforcement issues in the chancery.24
B. ChanceryEnforcement
The Chancellor's jurisdiction over charitable legacies always had been
concurrent with the ecclesiastical courts.25 Jurisdiction over charitable
uses, or trusts, 26 however, had traditionally been within the exclusive
domain of the chancery. 27 The English chancery courts enforced charitable
trusts as early as the 1400s. 21 This fact would give American courts
considerable difficulty centuries later, particularly in PhiladelphiaBaptist
Ass 'n v. Hart's Executors and Vidal v. Girard.
Once the enforcement of legacies, charitable and otherwise, became an
established feature of the chancery, the law developed to distinguish
between enforceable and unenforceable charities. The litmus test of this
distinction evolved from the abuse and mismanagement of charitable
bequests to Roman Catholic priests for the purpose of offering mass in
honor of the deceased.29 Such arrangements were known as chantries.3" In
response to widespread abuse of chantries among the priesthood, a series
of laws was enacted to correct such abuses by suppressing chantries.3 The
restraint on chantries eventually led to the concept of the unenforceable,
superstitious use.32 Chantry statutes proved important in the evolving law

23. See id. at 5 (describing the factors that contributed to the ecclesiastical court's
"unpopular[ity] with the laity").
24. See id.
25. See id at 6. Although both the chancellor and the bishop enjoyed jurisdiction over
charitable enforcement cases, the bishops presided over the lion's share of such cases from 1350
until c. 1530. See id. at app. A; see also BAKER, supra note 20, at 112-34 (discussing the court of

chancery and equity).
26. See generallyJames J. Fishman, The Development ofNonprofit CorporationLaw and an

Agenda for Reform, 34

EMORY

L.J. 617, 639 (1985) ("In England charitable organizations

ordinarily were organized as charitable trusts.").
27. See JONES, supra note 20, at 6. Jones notes that after Nicholas Bacon stepped down as
Lord Keeper in 1579, suits to enforce legacies were directed to the ecclesiastical courts with the

exception of charitable legacies. See id. at 17-18.
28. See FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 348.2, at 27.
29. See JONES, supra note 20, at 10 ("Complaints that chantries had been allowed to lapse
and that their endowments had been appropriated by the priest, the founder or the founder's heirs

were not infrequent .... ").
30. The term "chantry" refers to "[a]n endowment for the maintenance of one or more priests
to sing daily mass for the souls of the founders or others specified by them," as well as "the body
of priests so endowed." THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOL. 1II, at 22 (2d ed. 1989).
31. See JONES, supra note 20, at I1.
32. See generally id. at 82-87 (describing the disfavored status of gifts to Roman Catholic
charities under the general prohibition of charities for so-called superstitious uses). The first chantry
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of charity for reasons apart from their reflection of anti-Catholic
sentiments and changing social views toward religion. First, such statutes
signaled a shift in the concept of philanthropy away from the religious to
the secular." Second, these statutes drew a distinction between enforceable
and unenforceable charitable purposes.34
The distinction between enforceable and unenforceable charities
underscored the need for an enforcement procedure.35 By the mid-sixteenth
century, the procedure of simple bill and answer emerged as the
recognized method of redress for the misappropriation of charitable
assets.36 At first, the bill and answer promised to be a model of efficiency
and simplicity." Anyone alleging mismanagement of a charity was free to
seek redress by filing a bill of complaint with the chancery.3" The early
promise of this procedure would not come to fruition, however, as the
procedure was abused by litigants through delay tactics and protracted
motions and pleadings.39 Although the bill and answer allowed for
representative actions brought in the name of the attorney general, the
statute (37 Henry VIII c. 4) operated to void uses and bequests for chantry purposes. See id. at 11.
The legislative purpose, however, was not aimed at theological issues, but rather at secular,
economic concerns. See id.Thus, the statute was designed to stop the flow of assets into charitable
uses for chantry purposes to the detriment of the Crown's war effort against France and Scotland.
See id. The theological character of anti-chantry statutes was not stated explicitly until the
enactment of I Edward VI c. 14. See id. Lord Coke noted that this second chantry statute was
intended "to extirpate out of men's minds these superstitious errors, and to take them utterly away."
Id. at 13. See generally HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, Vol. IV, at 11-54 (discussing the
Reformation).
33. See JONES, supra note 20, at 10.
34. See id. at 14-15.
35. Charitable enforcement involves the concept of breach of fiduciary duties as well as the
concept of charitable purposes that the law is prepared to recognize and protect. Although there is
considerable overlap between these two concepts, the focus of this article is on the latter.
Nevertheless, the fiduciary duty issue was addressed at common law by "[v]isitorial [r]ights."
Fishman, supra note 26, at 645-46. Fishman explains: "At common law the founders of a charitable
corporation, the individuals who originally donated funds and revenues, and their heirs, had the
right to visit, inquire into, and correct all irregularities and abuses which arose in the course of the
administration of the funds donated." Id at 646; see also Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who
(Else) Should Enforce the Duties of CharitableFiduciaries?,23 J. CORP. L. 655, 695-96 (1998)
("At common law, founders and endowers of charitable corporations had a power of visitation to
supervise their gifts.").
36. See generally JONES, supra note 20, at 16-21, and app. B (describing mid-sixteenth
century bills and answers in the chancery courts concerning alleged abuses of charitable uses); W.J.
JONES, THE ELIZABETHAN COURT OF CHANCERY 177-336 (1967) (discussing the history and

procedure of the chancery courts from 1558 until 1603).
37. See JONES, supra note 20, at 19.
38. See id. at 17-19.
39. See id. at 19 ("The procedure of the Court of Chancery was initially both simple and
speedy.... Pleadings became progressively more verbose and delaying motions, both before and
after judgment, more frequent.").
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small amount of money involved in a typical complaint simply made it
impractical to challenge the disposition of charitable assets in the chancery
court.4 As a result of these short-comings, over the period in which the
chancery bill and answer was the exclusive means of charitable
enforcement, the Chancellor entertained an average of only one to two
suits per year.4 ' Although the bill and answer procedure retained the
traditional canon law bias in favor of charities, it ultimately proved
cumbersome and ineffectual.42
C. The Statute of Elizabeth and the Commissioners
The Statute of Elizabeth 43 was enacted in 1601 in response to the lack
of chancery enforcement.44 Although this statute would ultimately exert a
tremendous influence on the substantive law of charity, its original
purpose was merely to correct the procedural infirmities that plagued late
sixteenth century enforcement. 45 As previously discussed, deficiencies in
ecclesiastical enforcement gave rise to chancery enforcement. In turn,
deficiencies in chancery enforcement gave rise to the enforcement regime
set forth in the Statute of Elizabeth.
Most significantly, the Statute of Elizabeth's new enforcement scheme

40. See id.
at 20-21 (describing the issue of standing regarding charitable enforcement issues
where "there was no single 'legal' person whose interests would be affected .... ).
41. See id. at 18-19 ("The number of bills to enforce charitable uses and legacies between
1532 and 1601 ...was, as far as can be judged from the Public Record Office Lists and Indexes,
13 1; so that for the period from 1400 to 1601, the number of bills amounted to [approximately]
223.").
42. See id. at 18 (discussing the Entry Books of Decrees and Orders).
43. See Stat. 43 Eliz. 1, c.4 (1601). This statute is also known as the "Statute of Charitable
Uses," the "Charitable Uses Act," and "An Act to Redress the Misemployment of Lands, Goods,
and Stocks of Money Heretofore Given to Charitable Uses." The majority of American courts and
commentators, however, simply refer to it as the "Statute of Elizabeth." See Terry M. Knowles, A
BriefHistoryofCharitableRegulation,NEw HAMPSHIRE B.J., Dec. 1996, at 8, 9; JONES, supra note
20, at 23. The Statute of Elizabeth was preceded by a similar statute enacted in 1597, "An Acte to
reforme Deceits and Breaches of Trust, touching Lands given to Charitable Uses," 39 Eliz. 1, c. 6;
see JONES, supra note 20, at 23. This earlier statute was enacted in response to the social unrest
resulting from late sixteenth century famine and war with Spain. See id. at 22. In order to more
effectively cope with this social upheaval, Parliament sought to aid charitable endeavors by
improving enforcement. See id. The 1601 enactment of The Statute of Elizabeth was necessary to
correct a conflict with the Magna Carta's mandate of "challenges to jurors" contained in 39 Eliz.
1,c. 6. See JONES, supranote 20, at 24-25. The Statute of Elizabeth, however, is substantively a reenactment of its predecessor. See id.
The most significant difference between the two statutes is the
inclusion of the preamble in the later enactment. See id.
44. See generally HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, Vol. IV, at 398-99 (discussing the Statute
of Elizabeth).
45. See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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replaced the Chancellor with groups of commissioners.46 These
commissioners were "appointed to inquire into 'any breach of trust, falsity,
non-employment, concealment, misgovernment or conversion' of
charitable funds."*7 The commissioners exercised jurisdiction over the
types of charities enumerated in the preamble of the statute.48 The
commissioners'sjurisdiction also extended to charities within the "equity"
of the preamble. 49 Essentially, both the express terms and the spirit of the
preamble combined to bring virtually all secular charities within the
commissioner's jurisdiction. Consequently, religious charities were
beyond the scope of the statute and, thus, remained within the purview of
the Chancellor.5"
The procedure and mechanics of a commission's inquiry were simple.
Under the Statute of Elizabeth, the Lord Chancellor was empowered to
"set down such orders, judgments and decrees" as necessary to enforce
charitable trusts in accordance with the intent of the donor.5 In order to
accomplish this task, the Lord Chancellor appointed a minimum of five
commissioners for a given county.52 Typically, a charitable abuse came to
the attention of the commissioners through a complaint brought under oath
by twelve men." Based on the complaint, the sheriff issued warrants and
summoned "interested part[ies]" to the hearing.5 4 Many of these hearings
were held in relatively informal settings, such as a commissioner's home.55
The commissioners convened a hearing and began the inquiry in the
presence of a jury of "twelve 'honest and lawful' men of the county who
did not pretend title and made no claim to the property devoted to the trust
.,56 After hearing witness testimony and receiving other evidence, the

46. See generally JONES, supranote 20, at 25 (discussing the origin of the office of attorney

general).
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 27-29. Some of the charitable purposes found to be within the equity of the
preamble included charities dedicated "[t]o find bows and arrows for children between the age of
seven and seventeen... [t]o build a causeway to a mill... [t]o support bastards, orphaned on the
death of their mothers.. . [t]o relieve the inhabitants of taxes for bastards... [and t]o maintain a
public midwife within the parish .... Id. at 27-28 (quoting the Reading of Frances Moore).
50. See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
51. The Statute of Elizabeth, Stat. 43 Eliz. 1,c.4 (1601), reprintedin FRATCHER, supra note
12, § 348.2, at 30-31, n.8.
52. See JONES, supra note 20, at 40. One of the commissioners was required to be the
"Bishop of the diocese," while the others were required to be "persons of good and sound
behavior." Id.
53. See id. at 41.
54. Id. at 42. According to Jones and others, the term "interested party" was liberally
construed and included a broad class of individuals. See id. at 42-43.
55. See id. at 44.
56. See id. at 42 (quoting Moore).
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commissioners issued a decree to the court of chancery." Parties that did
not prevail before the commissioners could appeal to the Chancellor.5" If
the appeal to the Chancellor was unsuccessful, a final appeal could be
made to the Crown.59
Historical accounts suggest that charitable enforcement by the
commissioners was a great success initially." Moreover, the
commissioner's inquiry was, at the outset, a marked improvement over the
bill and answer procedure that it replaced. Legal historian Gareth Jones
explains:
The initial success of the commissioners' investigations can
be measured by the fact that in the twenty-four years from the
enactment of the first charity statute in 1597 to the death of
James I [in 162561] over one thousand decrees were sealed,
each one of which concerned the administration of a
particular charitable trust; whereas in the two hundred years
between 1400 and 1601 not more than one or two decrees
affecting charitable trusts could have been made by the
Chancellor annually.62
Thus, the commissioners corrected a great number of charitable abuses
that would have continued unabated under the previous enforcement
regime.
The most significant reason for the early success of the commissioners
was, perhaps, the commitment, confidence, and enthusiasm of those who
served as commissioners and jurors. 63 However, once this public
confidence and enthusiasm waned, the efficacy of the commissions was
fundamentally undermined." The death knell of the commissions was

57. See id. at 44.
58. See id. at 45.
59. See id. at 46.
60. See id. at 52.
61. See HANDBOOK OF DATES FOR STUDENTS OF ENGLISH HISTORY 25 (C.R. Cheney, ed.
1945).
62. JONES, supra note 20, at 52.
63. See id. at 53 ("As long as society appreciated the urgency of the charity commissioners'
task, the statutory procedure would flourish. However, once men become indifferent to the need
to sustain 'good godly and charitable uses,' the procedure would be revealed as cumbersome rather
than summary, dilatory rather than speedy, costly rather than cheap in execution.").
64. See id. ("The method of investigation ... could not efficiently function in a society whose
gentry served with reluctance as commissioners, whose jurors resented their jury service, whose
parish officers were lax and inefficient, whose central government was apathetic, and whose
Chancellor would not 'oppress any man for the sake of a charity' and bitterly regretted the
privileges which his predecessors had afforded the charitable trust.").
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finally sounded with the Civil War.65 The post-war hardships from the end
of the Civil War until the Restoration66 caused people to simultaneously
misappropriate charitable assets and to turn a blind eye to such behavior.67
Therefore, with the proliferation of charitable violations, and increased
public apathy, the once promising commissions ultimately failed to
effectively safeguard charitable trusts.
D. The Attorney General and the Re-emergence
of Chancery Enforcement
From the enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth until the Restoration,
the commissioners continued to investigate and correct charitable abuses.
However, as previously discussed, the subject matter jurisdiction of the
commissioners only extended to charitable endeavors specifically
enumerated in, or within the equity of, the preamble to the Statute of
Elizabeth. 68 For matters outside the letter and the spirit of the preamble,
and consequently, outside the scope of the statutory reform, the chancery

65. See id at 53-54 (discussing the comments of Henry Twyford and John Hene in the mid1670s).
66. The English Civil War ended in 1645. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 12, Vol. VI, at 14263. The Restoration occurred in 1660. See id. at 148-49.
67. See JONES, supra note 20, at 53-54.
68. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. The preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth
provides as follows:
Whereas Landes Tenementes Rentes Annuities Profittes Hereditamentes, Goodes
Chattels Money and Stockes of Money have bene heretofore given limitted
appointed and assigned, as well by the Queenes most excellent Majestie and her
moste noble Progenitors, as by sondrie other well disposed persons, some for
Releife of aged impotent and poore people, some for Maintenance of sicke and
maymed Souldiers and Marriners, Schooles of Learninge, Free Schooles and
Schollers in Universities, some for Repaire of Bridges Portes Havens Causwaies
Churches Seabankes and Highewaies, some for Educacion and prefermente of
Orphans, some for or towardes Releife Stocke or Maintenance of Howses of
Correccion, some for Mariages of poore Maides, some for Supportacion Ayde and
Helpe of younge tradesmen Handicraftesmen and persons decayed, and others for
releife or redemption of Prisoners or Captives, and for aide or ease of any poore
Inhabitantes conceminge paymente of Fifteenes, setting out of Souldiers and other
Taxes; Whiche Landes Tenementes Rents Annuities Profitts Hereditaments
Goodes Chattells Money and Stockes of Money nevertheles have not byn
imployed accordinge to the charitable intente of the givers and founders thereof,
by reason of Fraudes breaches of Truste and Negligence in those that shoulde pay
delyver and imploy the same.
Preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth, Stat. 43 Eliz. I, c.4 (1601), reprintedin JONES, supra note 20,
at 224, App. D.
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courts simply retained jurisdiction.6 9 Among the charitable purposes
enumerated in the preamble, a secular character was the common
denominator. 70 The preamble, thus, reflected the shift in late-sixteenth
century English philanthropy from religious to secular purposes.7' More
significant, however, was the exclusion of religious charities from the
subject matter jurisdiction of the commissioners under the Statute of
Elizabeth. 2 Therefore, by the early seventeenth century, enforcement of
religious charities (e.g., "uses for the support of preaching ministries, 73 )

was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the chancery.74
At approximately the same time, the attorney general made its first
brief appearance on the charitable enforcement scene. The modem office
of attorney general originated with Edward II's appointment of William
Langley to the position in 1315." 5 At common law, the attorney general
enjoyed the power to bring the malfeasance of charitable fiduciaries to the
attention of the Chancellor.76 Procedurally, this was accomplished by filing
an information in the form of a bill and answer.7 7 Additionally, individuals
could file bills in the Court of Chancery in the name of the attorney

69. See JONES, supra note 20, at 26.
70. See supra note 68.
71. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
72. See JONES, supra note 20, at 34-35.
73. Id. at 34.
74. See id. at 34-35. This issue arose in Pember v. Inhabitantsof Kington, in which a group
of commissioners was rebuked in their attempt to assert jurisdiction over acharitable bequest "for
and towardes the maynteninge of a preachinge." Id. at 35. The presiding Justices agreed "that the
circumstances of the case considered the maintenaunce of a preacher the in said case is not within
I...
Id.
the meaninge of the statue of 43 Elizabeth .
75. See JOHN SAINTY, A LIST OF ENGLISH LAW OFFICERS, KING'S COUNSEL AND HOLDERS
OF PATENTS OF PRECEDENCE 41-42, 278-88 (1987). Sainty explains:
At first [the attorney general's antecedent] was not accorded a specific title in the
The holder of the
letters patent but in 1327 he was designated king's attorney ....
post was originally in principle an officer of the Court of Common Pleas.
However, William Langley was given authority to act elsewhere in 1315 and this
precedent was invariably followed from... 1382.... The salary of the attorney
general was originally £10.
Id. at 41. Some accounts suggest an overlap in responsibility as well as a common origin among
the offices of attorney general, king's attorney, king's serjeants at law, and king's prime or ancient
serjeant. See generally id.; MAUREEN MULHOLLAND, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO BRITISH
HISTORY 63-64 (John Cannon ed. 1997) (discussing the origin of the office of attorney general).
For an interesting discussion of the contemporary attorney general's role in the British
Commonwealth, see JOHN EDWARDS, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, POLITICS AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST (1984).

76. See JONES, supra note 20, at 34.
77. See generally id.
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general.78 Historian Jones notes "a small crop of informations brought in
the name of the Attorney-General and directed to recalcitrant churchwardens and parishioners" filed between 1635 and 1638. 79 These
complaints, however, were limited to religious charities and were not part
of a cohesive enforcement regime."
In the early seventeenth century, the commissioners had subject matter
jurisdiction over secular charities while the chancery, employing the
"information" with the involvement of the attorney general, enjoyed
subject matter jurisdiction over religious charities. 8 The chancery court
remained as the sole means of charitable enforcement to fill the void left
by the failure of the commissioners. 2 The fall of the commissioners was
also accompanied by the rise of the attorney general as the principal actor
in charitable enforcement. 3 The attorney general's authority over
charitable trusts was rooted in the Crown's power as paterpatriae,which
encompassed religious charities as well as the commissioner's jurisdiction
over secular charities.84 Charitable abuses were brought to the attention of
the chancery by an information filed by the attorney general.85 By the late
seventeenth century, this procedure was firmly established as the
appropriate means to enforce all charities.8 6 Essentially, the split in subject
matter jurisdiction between secular and religious charities was erased with
the decline of the commissions.8 7 Thus, matters within the scope of the
commissioners' jurisdiction (secular charities) came to be treated in the
same way as matters traditionally outside of their jurisdiction (religious
charities). The chancery and the attorney general, therefore, assumed roles
as regulators of all charitable trusts.

78. See id.
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 54.
82. See id. at 54-55 (discussing statements of subject matter jurisdiction contained in
informations filed in the chancery courts from the 1670s and 1680s in an effort to persuade the
court to exercise jurisdiction).
83. See id. at 55 n.3 (listing a series of cases, from 1670 through 1680, which solidified the
propriety of the information in the chancery as the preferred means of charitable enforcement).
84. See id. at 55.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 55-56; see also id. at 93 n.3 ("[b]y [the 1690s] it had been held that the proper
procedure to determine the fate of surplus [charitable] funds was by information in Chancery, in
the name of the Attorney-General at the relation of an individual .... ).
87. See id. at 56 (noting that "[t]he last commission was issued in 1787. By this time the
statutory procedure was a creaking anachronism.").
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E. English CharitableEnforcement
and the American Revolution
Although the commissions ultimately failed to successfully reform
charitable enforcement, the Statute of Elizabeth marked a crucial
milestone in the development of charitable trust law for several reasons.
First, the preamble's list of recognized charitable activities proved
important in shaping the law of England, and later the United States, by
delineating the scope, nature, and legality of charitable purposes.88 Second,
by codifying the common law of charitable trusts, the Statute of Elizabeth
synthesized custom, practice, and precedent and provided a concrete
foundation for the further refinement of charitable trust law. Finally, the
adoption and subsequent failure of the enforcement provision helped
clarify the role of the attorney general as the primary agent of charitable
enforcement.89
In time, however, the attorney general would also fail to adequately
enforce charitable trusts, just as the ecclesiastical courts and the
commissions previously had failed. As Jones notes, "the information
proved to be even more tardy, costly and frustrating than the commissionprocedure it supplanted .... ,90 Attorney general enforcement proved
inadequate for largely procedural reasons. In seventeenth and eighteenth
century England, informations alleging charitable abuses were filed in the
chancery in the name of the attorney general. 9' The attorney general's
powers, however, were limited in two respects. First, the attorney general
could only act upon the relation of a private individual. 92 Second, in the
interests of fairness, the attorney general could not bear the costs of
maintaining an action to correct a charitable abuse.93 This meant that the
relator had to bear the costs of litigation, and understandably, most
potential relators were unwilling to do so. 4 These deficiencies were not
corrected until the early nineteenth century.9 5 By this time, however, the
United States had long since gained independence from England, and

88. See id. at 120. The preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth was ultimately adopted as the
legal definition of "charity" in 1804 in Morice v. Bishop ofDurham, 9 Ves. 399 (1804). See JONES,
supra note 20, at 120.
89. See JONES, supra note 20, at 120.
90. Id. at 160.
91. See id. at 161.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 165. Under Romilly's Act (25 George III, c. 101 (1812)), interested parties
could file a petition with the Lord Chancellor seeking a summary inquiry of an alleged charitable
abuse and, thus, obviate the need to file a relator action in the name of the attorney general. See id
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American law was no longer subject to English statutory reforms.
Despite the innovations that flowed from the Statute of Elizabeth, its
English heritage posed unique problems to the courts of the emerging
United States. The former colonies "were in the curious predicament of
rebelling against the British Crown, and yet being forced by circumstances
to continue operating under British laws." 96 As with all English statutes,
the Statute of Elizabeth presented a dilemma to the newly independent
states. While the preamble applied to conditions in the United States, the
remedial provision was limited by its terms to English circumstances. 97
Moreover, the prevailing wisdom of the late 1700s was that English
charitable enforcement was dependent upon the Statute of Elizabeth. 98 The
repeal of English laws in the United States, including the Statute of
Elizabeth, placed the status of charities on precarious ground in the
emerging American law. 99 Throughout the first half of the nineteenth
century, the United States Supreme Court would resolve these issues,
including the appropriate role of the attorney general.

96. HOWARD S. MILLER, THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 1776-

1844, at 9-10 (1961) (discussing the temporary retention of English statutes in Vermont in 1797);
see also Stanley N. Katz et al., Legal ChangeandLegalAutonomy: CharitableTrusts in New York
1777-1893, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 51, 59 (1985) (discussing the temporary retention of English
statutes under the New York Constitution of 1777). See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS

1760-1830 (2d ed. 1994) (discussing post-revolutionary legal changes in New England
in general, Massachusetts in particular).
97. See generally FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 348.3, at 35-36.
98. See infra note 114-25 and accompanying text. But see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 427-28 (3d ed. 1768); infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
99. See FRATCHER, supra note 12, § 348, at 35.
SOCIETY,
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III. TRUSTEES OF THE PHILADELPHIA BAPTISTASS 'N V.
HART'S EXECUTORS AND THE RESTRICTIVE VIEW TOWARD CHARITIES' 00

A. The Case
The legal status of charities and the enforcement of charitable trusts
were unsettled questions in the years immediately following the American
Revolution. Much of this confusion stemmed from the treatment of
English statutes and legal traditions by early eighteenth century American
courts.' The leading charitable enforcement case from this period is
Trustees ofthe PhiladelphiaBaptistAss 'n v. Hart'sExecutors.'o2 In Hart's
Executors, the United States Supreme Court defined the legal nature of
charities in light of the evolution that occurred as the nation graduated
from colonial to full-fledged sovereign status.'0 3
Silas Hart was a resident and citizen of Virginia."° In 1790, Hart
executed a will, providing that "'what shall remain of my military
certificates... I give and bequeath to the Baptist Association... which
I allow to be a perpetual fund for the education of youths of the Baptist
denomination, who shall appear promising for the ministry... .""0' Hart's
will described the Baptist Association as "that, for ordinary, meets at
Philadelphia, annually .... ,6 At the time Hart executed his will, the
Baptist Association was unincorporated and was not known by a more

100. The majority view of the development of charitable trust law in the United States adopts
the "first restrictive, then permissive" paradigm. Some commentators, however, reject this
dichotomy as overly simplistic. See, e.g., Katz et al., supra note 96, at 55, 88. Katz, et al. explain:
The history of the law of charity in New York illustrates the difficulties of
viewing American charity law in the nineteenth century as a battleground between
advocates of a "liberal" trust-based policy and a "restrictive" corporation-based
policy. Understanding the relationship between private direction and public
control of charity demands a close examination in individual jurisdictions of
institutional, social and political factors affecting changes in private law. More
important, it demands that the law of charity be understood in its relationship,
often a collateral one, to developments in the fields of corporations, real and
personal property, trusts and wills.

Id. at 88.
101. See, e.g., Note, supranote 19, at 442-51, 460-63 (discussing the apparent restrictive to
permissive evolution of judicial treatment of charities).
102. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1 (1819).
103. See id. at 4-27.
104. See id. at 2.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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specific designation.10 7 The Baptist Association did not become "The
Trustees of the Philadelphia Baptist Association," with the benefit of a
state charter, until 1797.08 Silas Hart died in 1795.109
The controversy, and subsequent litigation, began when the executors
of Hart's will refused to pay the charitable devise to the Baptist
Association in accordance with the will. " 0 The executors defended their
refusal to convey the property on the grounds that because the Baptist
Association was unincorporated at the time of Hart's death, the Baptist
Association lacked legal standing to accept the devise."' The Court
accepted the executors's argument and found in their favor on the
dispositive issue of the Baptist Association's lack of competency to take
under a will as an unincorporated entity." 2 In the opinion of the Court,
Chief Justice Marshall noted that "[a]t the death of the testator, then, there
were no persons in existence who were capable of taking this bequest ....
This bequest was intended for a society which was not, at the time, and
might never be capable of taking it.""' 3
The Supreme Court, however, did not end its inquiry there. Rather, the
Court examined the fundamental nature of charities in the evolving
American law: "whether the character 'of this legacy, as a charity, will
entitle it to the protection of this court?" 14
The issue was framed by the parties in terms of the applicability and
effect of the Statute of Elizabeth under Virginia law.' ' In keeping with the
general trend of the former colonies, the Commonwealth of Virginia
repealed all English statutes, including the Statute of Elizabeth, in 1792.116
The Baptist Association maintained that a court's power to enforce
charities flowed directly from a court's general equity powers and
jurisdiction." 7 The executors, however, contended that the power to
enforce charities was derived directly from the Statute of Elizabeth and the
parenspatriaepower of the King, and not from general equity powers."'

107. See id. at 2-3.
108. See id. at 3.
109. See id. at 2.
110. See id. at 3.
I11. See id. at 3, 28.
112. See id. at28.
113. Id.
114. Id. at29.
115. Seeid. at3.
116. See id.; Katz et al., supranote 96, at 55 (discussing the treatment of English statutes and
common law in the New York Constitution of 1777).
117. See 17U.S. at30.
118. The Executors contended that such a charitable legacy "would be sustained in virtue of
the statute of the 43 of Elizabeth, or of the prerogative of the crown, or of both; and not in virtue
of those rules by which a court of equity, exercising its ordinary powers, is governed." Id. at 29.
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The executors reasoned that because (1) the American Revolution
eliminated the powers of the Crown in the United States and (2) the
Virginia Legislature repealed the Statute of Elizabeth, there was no basis
for state courts to enforce charities." 9
After an exhaustive examination of the legislative intent of the Statute
of Elizabeth and a review of a number of English chancery decisions,
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that, under English law, the sole basis
for equity jurisdiction over charities was rooted in the Statute of
Elizabeth.12 0 To support this contention, Marshall pointed to an apparent
lack of chancery cases enforcing charities prior to the enactment of the
Statute of Elizabeth in 1601 .121 "We have no trace... of an attempt in the
court of chancery... anterior to the statute, to enforce one of these vague
bequests to charitable uses."' 22 The Court reasoned that because the
equitable power to enforce charities originated solely from the Statute of
Elizabeth, the repeal of this statute in Virginia, and the other states,
stripped state courts and attorneys general of the power to enforce and
repair charitable
trusts where the bequest was vague or otherwise
123
defective.
In a separate opinion, Justice Story enumerated a number of English
equitable doctrines that generally supported the protection and
enforcement of charities.' 24 In an opinion that would ultimately set the
stage for the Court's decision in Vidal v. Girard,25 Justice Story made the
case that equitable jurisdiction to enforce charities could spring from a
court's legal jurisdiction. 26 Such an argument would free the equitable
enforcement of charitable trusts from its dependency upon the Statute of
Elizabeth. Nevertheless, in light of the absence of any records of equitable
enforcement of charities in the English chancery courts prior to 1601,
Justice Story was forced to conclude that the repeal of the Statute of
Elizabeth in Virginia deprived the Court of jurisdiction
to enforce Hart's
27
attempted bequest to the Baptist Association.
There are a number of possible reasons for the Hart's Executors

Because the Chancellor's powers also derived from the Crown, it is rather curious that the
Executors would argue that charitable enforcement authority derives from both the Statute of
Elizabeth, as well as the Crown. This assertion seems to undermine the Executor's position as the
King'sparenspatriaepower arguably provides an extra-statutory basis for charitable enforcement.
119. See id. at 29.
120. See id. at 27-50.
121. See id. at38.
122. Id. at 38.
123. See id. at 38-50.
124. See id. at51.
125. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
126. See id. at 144-45, 196-97.
127. See id.
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Court's historical error. First, the Court seemed to look for a clear and
unequivocal example of chancery enforcement of a bequest to a vague or
"' The Court could not find, and the Baptist
ambiguous beneficiary. 28
Association failed to produce, such a "smoking gun." Although the Baptist
Association offered a number of ancient cases that generally addressed
pre-seventeenth century charitable enforcement, the Court was able to
distinguish and ignore these cases and remain focused on the issue as they
narrowly defined it.'2 9
For example, the Court was persuaded by the executor's interpretation
of the treatment of conditional bequests in Porter's case. 30 If a
conveyance is conditional, the Hart's Executors Court reasoned, then the
conveyance fails if the condition fails. 13 1 In Porter'scase, a conditional
bequest failed, but there was no attempt to compel the Chancellor to cause
the condition to occur or to otherwise cure the failure. 32 Therefore, the
Hart'sExecutors Court concluded, if the grantor or beneficiary could have
repaired and enforced the bequest through the chancery, they would
have. 133 In other words, the Court mistakenly interpreted the absence of
enforcement of the failed trust in Porter'scase as proof of an absence of
chancery enforcement prior to the Statute of Elizabeth.
Second, the Hart'sExecutors Court accepted the premise that, by virtue
of the terms of the Statute of Elizabeth, only the types of charities
described in the statute were enforceable. 134 The flaw in this premise is that
certain charities (i.e., religious charities) were beyond the scope of the
Statute of Elizabeth's enforcement scheme, yet were nonetheless
enforceable in the chancery. 35 Neither the Hart's Executors Court nor
Blackstone (on whom the Court relied) squarely addressed this split in
subject matter jurisdiction between enforcement of secular and religious
charities by the commissioners and the Chancellor, respectively.
Blackstone, however, came closer to recognizing the bilateral regime of
charitable enforcement that existed with the enactment of the Statute of
Elizabeth.'36 Blackstone noted:
The king, as parenspatriae,has general superintendence of
all charities; which he exercises by the keeper of his
128. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 1, 6-10 (1819).
129. See id.
130. See id. at 35.
131. See id. at 33-35.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 33 ("The statute of the 43 Eliz. certainly gave validity to some devises to
charitable uses, which were not valid, independent of that statute.").
135. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
136. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 98, at 427-28.
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conscience, the chancellor. And therefore, whenever it is
necessary, the attorney general, at the relation of some
information... files ex officio an information in the court of
chancery to have the charity properly established. By statute
also 43 Eliz. c. 4. authority is given to the lord chancellor or
lord keeper, and to the chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster,
respectively, to grant commissions under their several seals,
to inquire into any abuses of charitable donations, and rectify
the same by decree; which may be reviewed in the respective
courts of the several chancellors, upon exceptions taken
thereto.137
Thus, Blackstone describes a bilateral regime of charitable enforcement,
involving both the traditional role of the attorney general in the chancery
and the statutorily established role of commissioners and the Lord
Chancellor.
The fact that the Hart's Executors Court was aware of Blackstone's
work and, presumably, his description of a bilateral enforcement regime
compounds the factual and historical error of the Court. Nevertheless, the
root of the Court's error may lie in the fact that both it and Blackstone
ignored the split in subject matter jurisdiction between religious and
secular enforcement. Consequently, the Court erroneously concluded that
all charitable
enforcement began and ended with the Statute of
38
Elizabeth.
Finally, the Hart's Executors Court could only consider what was
presented before it. It is possible that the Court was led astray by counsel
on both sides, who were undoubtedly more concerned with zealous
advocacy than with historical accuracy.' In any event, the Court would0
seize the opportunity to rectify this historical blunder in Vidal v. Girard.14
The historicalfauxpas notwithstanding, Hart'sExecutors was a milestone
in the developing law of charity and reflected the prevailing social views
that influenced nineteenth century American philanthropy.
B. The Restrictive View Toward Charities
Presumably, the Supreme Court could have enforced the charitable
trust at issue in Hart'sExecutors. Hart's testamentary intent was clear and
it would have been a short step in logic from the 'Baptist Association

137. Id.
138. See Hart's Executors, 17 U.S. at36.
139. See generally CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY
(1972) (discussing the mishandling of history on the part of judges and attorneys and the
intellectual and historical difficulties that often result).
140. See infra notes 172-98 and accompanying text.
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that, for ordinary, meets at Philadelphia, annually"""' to "The Trustees of
the Philadelphia Baptist Association."' 42 The fact that the Court was
willing to find a fatal uncertainty in Hart's will reflected deeper societal
attitudes toward charities and equity that informed and shaped the Court's
legal reasoning.
The English origins and traditions that pervade charitable trust law
invited anti-British hostility. In the years following independence, much
43
of American society viewed all things British with distrust. This antiBritish sentiment included hostility toward English laws and was
attributable to a prevailing conviction that "English law was the product
of an aristocratic society, and, therefore, unfit for America.' 4 4 Many
Americans were simply not content to perpetuate a legal regime that
originated from their former colonial master. 45 Reverend William Ellery
Channing remarked in 1830, for example, that "'the true sovereigns of a
country are those who determine its mind. A people, whose government
and laws are nothing but the embodiment of public' 4opinion, should
jealously guard this opinion against foreign dictation." "1
In addition to an anti-British prejudice, early Americans were deeply
committed to separating religion and government and maintaining a
balance between them. 147 Charities have historically possessed a strong
religious character and were administered primarily by religious groups in
the new states, just as they had been in England. 48 Legal rules that
disfavored charities insured that religious organizations would be unable
to amass wealth and power through charitable trusts.'49 Henry SaintGeorge Tucker, of the Virginia Supreme Court, stated this point in
Gallego 's Executors v. Attorney General,5 ' warning that "the Church, 'if
made capable to take,... never can part with any thing.' Unless Virginia
act[s] quickly to curb bequests to religious organizations, the 'whole
property of society' would be 'swallowed up in the insatiable gulph of
public charities ....

141. 17 U.S. at 27.
142. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 12-13.
143. See id. at 11.
144. Id. at 12.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 11. Poet Philip Freneau made this same point more eloquently: "Can we never be
thought to have learning or grace; Unless it be brought from that horrible place; Where tyranny
reigns with her imprudent face?" Id.
147. See Note, supra note 19 at 443.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. 30 Va. 450 (1832).
151. MILLER, supra note 96, at 25; see also Note, supra note 19, at 443-44.
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A related concern involved the desire to keep financial assets out of
charitable trusts so they could remain in the economy at-large.'52 Many
charitable bequests involved grants of land or personal property which
were neither easily convertible to cash nor amenable to exchange.'53 As
one commentator noted, "[o]nce such property was placed in trust for the
benefit of a perpetual charity, it was likely to remain in the charity's
control and out of the flow of commerce indefinitely. The effect of this
withdrawal was to stifle economic development by lessening the amount
of available capital."' 54
Early American society was also wary of equitable doctrines and
chancery courts5.' "In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,...
the decisions handed down [by chancery courts] often appeared arbitrary.
and high-handed."' 56 Moreover, chancellors were accused of abusing their
broad discretion by blindly approving the "royal prerogative."'5 7
Additionally, many jurists regarded equitable doctrines as difficult to
implement.'58 As one commentator noted, "[m]ost of the critics of
chancery objected to the administration of the court rather than to the
character of equity law."' 59 As a result of these perceived shortcomings,
equitable doctrines were out of favor in early America as a source of
authority and jurisdiction.'60 Because charitable trusts depended on equity
as a basis for enforcement, the popular sentiment against equity translated
into an unfavorable environment for charitable trusts. 16 1 Moreover, the
disfavored status of equity deprived the attorney general of its primary
basis of enforcement.
Another factor militating against a favorable legal view toward
charities involved early American belief in the social utility of poverty. 62
The essential function of charities has traditionally been the alleviation of
human suffering, particularly indigence. 16 There were many people of the
152. See Note, supra note 19, at 446.
153. See id.
154. Id. at 444. Echoes of this economic critique are found in contemporary commentaries on
charitable enforcement. See infra notes 277-80 and accompanying text.
155. See MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 121
(1986).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See id.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 381, 399 (1959) (defining the primary
equitable charitable enforcement doctrines of deviation and cy pres, respectively).
162. See Note, supra note 19, at 445-46.
163. See generally PHILANTHROPY IN THE WORLD'S TRADITIONS (Warren F. Ilchman, Stanley
N. Katz, & Edward L. Queen, II eds. 1998) (describing the historical, religious, and cultural
aspects of philanthropy on a global and historical basis).
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opinion, however, that poverty acted "as a goad to spur the ambitious to
success and as a penalty for failure in the economic struggle."' 1 Based
upon this reasoning, charities were viewed as antithetical to economic
growth because they sought to remove the incentives for economic success
and the consequences of economic failure.165 This attitude was also
supported by religious and moral teachings of the day. 166 Ironically, such
67
a world view upset the traditional alliance between religion and charity.1
Nevertheless, economic status was viewed as the just result of one's moral
character. 161 "[A] man's economic condition derived from his own moral
shortcomings. Excessive drinking, promiscuity and laziness were thought
to be the chief causes of indigence."'' 69 Therefore, just as society viewed
charities as upsetting the economic balance, society believed that charities
upset the moral balance by removing the consequences of "immoral"
behavior.
Other reasons for hostility toward charities under early American law
included concerns that the creation of charitable trusts would operate to
unfairly disinherit heirs'70 and upset the authoritative resonance that the
restrictive view of charities enjoyed as a result of Marshall and Story's
endorsement in Hart'sExecutors."' The result of these legal rules and
prevailing societal attitudes was an atmosphere that generally disfavored
charitable trusts. Consequently, both contrary legal doctrines and social
opposition impeded charitable enforcement.
IV. VIDAL V. GIRARD AND THE PERMISSIVE VIEW TOWARD CHARITIES

A. The Case
Judicial and social hostility toward charities slowly began to decline
throughout the 1820s and 1830s. This shift in attitude culminated in 1844
in Vidal v. Girard.7 2 Like Hart's Executors, Vidal was essentially a will
contest. 73 Stephen Girard was born in France in the mid-1700s and settled

164. Note, supra note 19, at 446.
165. See id. at 445.
166. See id. at 446.
167. See id. at 445-46.
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 445.
171. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 24. "[l]nferior courts soon cited and followed the [Hart's
Executors] ruling. Its restrictive doctrines, supported by the reputations of Story and Marshall ...."
Id.
172. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127 (1844).
173. See id.
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in Philadelphia around 1780."74 At the time of his death in 1831, Girard
had amassed a considerable fortune. 175 Girard's will contained a charitable
bequest "to provide for such a number of poor male white orphan children
... a better education, as well as a more comfortable maintenance ....176
In order to realize his goal of assisting certain children of Philadelphia,
Girard's will created a trust of two million dollars "to apply and expend so
much of that sum as may be necessary, in erecting ...a permanent
college, with suitable out-buildings,.. . decent and suitable furniture, '...
77
books and all things needful to carry into effect my general design."1
and Citizens of Philadelphia" as
Girard designated "the Mayor, Aldermen,
178
trusts.
various
his
of
the trustees
Shortly after Girard's death, the Pennsylvania legislature passed a
number of acts for the express purpose of enabling "'the Mayor,
Aldermen, and Citizens of Philadelphia to carry into effect certain
improvements, and to execute [Girard's] trusts."",179 Four years later, in
October 1836, Girard's heirs filed a complaint in federal court against the
City of Philadelphia seeking to prevent the city from taking funds from the
trust created under Girard's will.' The heirs, through their attorney
Daniel Webster, attacked Girard's trusts on several grounds. First, the
heirs argued that because the City of Philadelphia was "incapable of
executing [a trust like the one created by Girard's will], or of taking and
holding a legal estate for the benefit of others,"'' the trusts failed as
"indefinite, vague, and uncertain."' 82 Second, the trusts were attacked on
jurisdictional grounds.8 3 The heirs, relying on Hart's Executors, argued
that the equity jurisdiction to enforce charitable trusts in England was
rooted in the "king's prerogative," and, therefore, with the repeal of the
Statute of Elizabeth and the severing of political ties with England, there
was no jurisdictional basis in American law to enforce vague or uncertain
174. See id. at 128.
175. See id. Girard's estate consisted of $1,700,000 in real estate and at least $5,000,000 in
personal property. See id.
176. Id. at 129. In addition to an intent to benefit certain children, Girard sought to improve
the area of Philadelphia near the Delaware River by providing funds for the building and
maintenance of various capital improvements. See id.
177. Id. at 130. Girard's will contained highly detailed instructions regarding the design and
furnishing of the school, as well as directives on curriculum, admissions standards, discipline, and
the hiring of faculty and staff. See id. at 130-36.
178. Id. at 129.
179. Id. at 138. One such act was enacted on March 24, 1832 and another was enacted on April
4, 1832. See id.
180. See id. at 139. The heirs's complaint was in the form of a bill, an amended bill, and a bill
of revivor. See id.
181. Id.at 141.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 143.
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charitable trusts in equity.' Finally, the heirs argued that Girard's trusts
were void as against public policy because certain requirements in the trust
instrument forbade clergymen from holding office in, or even visiting, the
college created by the trust. 5 The crux of the heirs' argument, therefore,
was that American courts were without jurisdiction to enforce vague,
uncertain, or otherwise defective charitable trusts as a result of the English
statutory pedigree of the chancery court's equity jurisdiction over such
matters.
In response, the City of Philadelphia answered the heirs' arguments by
seeking to divorce the basis of charitable enforcementj urisdiction from the
Statute of Elizabeth." 6 This was accomplished by demonstrating the
existence of charitable enforcement under English law prior to 1601. 87 If
charitable enforcement was rooted in the non-statutory, equitable doctrines
of England, then the repeal of the Statute of Elizabeth in the various states,
as well as the lack of royal parenspatriaepower or prerogative, would not
deprive state courts or attorneys general of the authority to enforce
charitable trusts. Rather, American courts would be free to exercise equity
jurisdiction over charitable trusts as a direct result of the legal tradition
inherited from England. Moreover, American attorneys general would be
able to enforce charitable trusts, just like their English counterparts.
In support of its argument, the City of Philadelphia pointed to the
existence of tenures in "frankalmoign," and other "perpetual charities in
trust" that existed during the late fourteenth century. 8 The city then
briefly detailed the history of charities and the mortmain statutes that were
enacted by various monarchs to seize charitable assets for the Crown.8 9 In
light of this historical background, the city argued that the Statute of
Elizabeth was enacted merely to codify the preservation of charities and
"to lessen the evil of pauperism by hunting up charities, but which
established no new principle in the laws of England."'" In other words, the
city contended that the Statute of Elizabeth simply codified an ancient and

184. See id. at 144. Girard's heirs argued that "[t]he jurisdiction over charities is not within
the ordinary powers of equity, but falls back upon the king's prerogative.... It must be an extrajudicial function to set aside a will. How could this power have passed over to a revolutionized and
republican state?" Id. at 144-45.
185. See id.at 143. Girard's will provided that "no ecclesiastic, missionary, or minister of any
sect whatsoever, shall ever hold or exercise any station or duty whatever in the said college...."
Id.
186. See id. at 150.
187. See id. at 150-51.
188. See id. at 151.
189. See id The City of Philadelphia pointed to a transfer of charitable assets from the Knight
Templars to the Knights of St. John in 1334, as well as the mortmain statutes instituted under Henry
VIII in an attempt to seize monastic properties. See id.
190. Id.
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recognized practice and procedure; it did not substantively add to the body
of charitable enforcement law.
Justice Story, writing for the Court, began where he left off inHart's
Executors. In rejecting the heirs' first argument, the Court held that "where
the [City of Philadelphia] has a legal capacity to take real or personal
estate, there it may take and hold it upon trust, in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private person may do."' 9 ' As to the second argument
advanced by the heirs concerning the validity of charitable trusts under
Pennsylvania law, the Court began by citing numerous English opinions
in support of the proposition that charitable enforcement stems from
general equity jurisdiction and not from the Statute of Elizabeth. 92 Most
significantly, however, was Justice Story's reliance upon newly discovered
English chancery cases that conclusively demonstrated the existence of
charitable enforcement which pre-dated the Statute of Elizabeth.' 93 The
consequences of this discovery were that (1) a court's equity power to
enforce charities was undoubtedly rooted in an extra-statutory and
equitable legal tradition, and (2) such power existed independent of the
Statute of Elizabeth. Thus, the repeal of the Statute of Elizabeth by the
several states did not deprive state courts or attorneys general of the power
to enforce charitable trusts.
Between Hart'sExecutors and Vidal, the Commissioners of the Public
Records in England began a review of chancery records dating from prior
to the enactment of the Statute of Elizabeth.' 94 Published in 1827, the
Calendars of the Proceedings in Chancery "showed conclusively that
English courts had indeed enforced charitable trusts long before 1601 "19'
The publication of the Calendars was immediately seized upon by
American courts as a basis to undermine the restrictive view of charities
that arose from the Hart'sExecutors decision.196 Based upon the findings
191. Id. at 187-88.
192. See id. at 194.
There are, however, dicta of eminent judges.., which do certainly support the
doctrine that charitable uses might be enforced in chancery upon the general
jurisdiction of the court, independently of the [Statute of] Elizabeth; and that the
jurisdiction had been acted upon not only subsequent but antecedent to that
statute.
Id. The Court rejected the third of the heirs's arguments--objections to the prohibition against
clergymen contained in Girard's trust--because it failed to find any conflict between the terms of
the trust and the constitution, laws, or policies of the state of Pennsylvania. See id. at 199-201.
193. See id. at 196.
194. See id.
195. MILLER, supra note 96, at 30.
196. See Note, supra note 19, at 447 (discussing Chancellor Samuel Jones's sustainment of
a charitable devise based upon the Calendars in M'Carteev. Orphan Asylum Soc 'y, 9 Cow. 437
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published in the Calenders, Justice Story noted that "[a]mong these are
found many cases in which the Court of Chancery entertained jurisdiction
over charities long before the [Statute of] Elizabeth ....They establish
..that.., charities ...were familiarly
known to, and acted upon, and
197
Chancery."'
of
Court
the
in
enforced
Because charitable enforcement was part of the equity law of England,
the Vidal Court reasoned, the power, authority, and jurisdiction to enforce
charitable trusts was, therefore, "part of the common law of
Pennsylvania."' 98 As a result of the discovery ofpre-Elizabethan charitable
enforcement and Vidal, American courts were given broad discretion to
liberally enforce charitable trusts.
B. The Permissive View Toward Charities
Although the Vidal Court authoritatively approved the permissive view
of charities, certain states were more progressive in their enforcement of
charitable trusts prior to 1844. The constitutions of Pennsylvania,
Massachusetts, Vermont, and New Hampshire, for example, contained
provisions that expressly encouraged philanthropy.' 99 The constitutions of
Connecticut and Rhode Island were silent on the issue of charity; however,
these states generally "displayed a friendly attitude toward charitable trusts
and uses during the first decades of national independence. 2 0
This hospitable attitude toward charities was reflected in the courts of
these states.
In those states where social conditions and public opinion
combined to produce an atmosphere favorable to charities,
the judiciary was not inclined to be concerned about how the
power to enforce charitable trusts originated. Instead, they
found sufficient justifications for enforcement in custom,
benefit to the public, the English heritage of permissiveness,
and the power
of a testator to control the disposition of his
20
property. '

(N.Y. 1827)).
197. Vidal, 43 U.S. at 196.
198. Id.
199. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 15-17; see also Fishman, supra note 26, at 621-23
(discussing philanthropy in North America from the beginning of settlement through the early postrevolutionary period).
200. MILLER, supra note 96, at 17.
201. Note, supra note 19, at 460; see also Fishman, supra note 26, at 631-37 (describing
various state statutes in the late eighteenth century designed to facilitate and encourage the creation
of charitable corporations).
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Even in the so-called restrictive states, such as Virginia and Maryland,
there were periodic judicial and legislative attempts to ease restrictions on
charitable trusts.20 2
Despite the experiences of the individual states, Vidal imposed the
permissive view of charitable trusts upon the entire nation. Several factors
account for the shift in judicial treatment of charities between Hart's
Executors and Vidal.2" 3 One of the arguments against a permissive view of
charities concerned fears that such a legal regime would allow religious
institutions to grow too strong, and thus, upset the delicate balance
between church and state. 2° Because "politically powerful, state-supported
in permissive jurisdictions, these fears
church[es]" never emerged
20 5
eventually subsided.
At the time Hart'sExecutors was decided, the American economy was
largely agricultural.20 6 Charitable trusts were disfavored because it was
believed that they operated to keep potentially productive land out of the
economy. 20 By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, "this
objection declined in importance as the growing use of currency changed
a land-based economy into one of a more fluid, exchange-oriented
nature. 208 Moreover, with increased urbanization, poverty was no longer
seen as a pro-social influence to motivate the industrious and punish the
idle.20 9 Therefore, the alleviation of poverty through charitable trusts
ceased to be viewed as an economic hindrance.
[D]evelopments in the latter part of the century clearly
indicated that man was not necessarily the master of his own
fate and that indigence was often the result of conditions over
which the individual had no control .... Since philanthropy
was an obvious means of improving the lot of the poor, it was
natural that it be encouraged in any way possible.210

202. See MILLER, supra note 96, at 28 (discussing Justice Dabney Carr's attempted retreats
from the Gallego and Janey's Executor decisions, the Virginia legislature's attempt "to alter the
course of the state's charity law," and the Maryland legislature's response to the Dashiell case). See
generallyGallego's Executors v. Attorney General, 30 Va. (3 Leigh) 450 (1832); Janey's Executors
v. Latane, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 327 (1833); Dashiell v. Attorney General, 5 H&J 392 (1822).
203. See generallyMILLER, supra note 96, at 41-42 (noting that a concern for individual rights
and property rights, as well as the popularity of social causes among the upper-class created an
atmosphere of permissiveness toward charities).
204. See Note, supra note 19, at 461-62.
205. Id. at461.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Id. at 461-63.
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Finally, charities commanded favorable legal treatment because of their
widespread popularity.2"' Charitable works for the benefit of the poor in
Boston were widely imitated in other cities.212 Local women's societies,
for example, typically engaged in educational and religious charitable
works.2" 3 Charitable activities became so widespread that one commentator
of the day noted, "'every infirmity, every misfortune, every vice even, has
a phalanx of philanthropists to oppose its effects.' 214 The proliferation of
charitable organizations did not escape judicial notice. In interpreting
issues involving charitable bequests, one judge advised, "' [liaws and acts
which tend to public utility ... should receive the most liberal and benign
interpretation to effect the object intended or declared.' 2 5 Such an
interpretative philosophy also mirrored a growing judicial deference
toward the donative intent of settlors. 2 6 The shift toward a favorable
treatment of charities, reflected in Vidal, allowed courts to be .more
proactive and assertive in upholding and preserving charitable trusts. This
permissive view also cleared the way for the attorney general to assume
its traditional enforcement role in the United States.
V. TRUSTEES OFDARTMOUTH COLLEGE V. WOODWARD
AND THE CONTEMPORARY ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

A. The Case
In England, the attorney general played an integral role in charitable
enforcement since at least the early 1600s. 217 Before this role could be
incorporated into American law, the status of charitable trusts needed to
be resolved. The result of Hart's Executors and Vidal was that charitable
trusts became favored under American law, and courts liberally construed
them in order to repair minor flaws in their creation and effectuate the
charitable intent of the settlor. Thus, by 1844, the courthouse became a
safe haven for charitable trusts in the United States. Once the courts settled
the legal status of charitable trusts, American law was ready to embrace
the traditional role of the attorney general.
Trustees ofDartmouthCollege v. Woodward arrived immediately after
Hart's Executors and its restrictive rule toward charitable trusts.
Nevertheless, elements of DartmouthCollege survived into the permissive,

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See MILLER, supra note 96, at 41-42.
See id. at 42.
See id.
Id. (quoting Samuel Gridley Howe's 1833 report in the North American Review).
Id. (quoting Judge Henry Baldwin).
See id.
See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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post-Vidal era and provided the precedential authority for charitable
enforcement by the state under the aegis of the attorney general.21
Dartmouth College involved a power struggle among the school's officers
and trustees. 219 In the mid-1 750's, Reverend Eleazer Wheelock established
"a charity school for the instruction of Indians in the Christian religion., 220
Reverend Wheelock received a royal charter in 1769, which incorporated
the school under the name "Dartmouth College. 2 2 ' In 1816, the New
Hampshire legislature passed a series of acts "'to amend the charter, and
enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College.' ' 222 The
impetus for these amendments was partly the dissatisfaction among the
trustees with John Wheelock, Reverend Wheelock's son and successor as
college president.223 In response to the amendments to the charter, the
trustees of the college split into two factions.224 One group organized itself
under the name "Dartmouth University," while the other continued to
operate as "Dartmouth College., 22 ' The remaining trustees of Dartmouth
College brought an action to recover "the book of records, corporate seal,
and other corporate property" from the treasurer of Dartmouth
University.226
Despite the academic infighting, the substantive importance of the case
was the constitutionality of state legislative amendments to corporate
charters. 227 Although the bulk of the Dartmouth College decision
concerned the developing status of corporations under the United States
229
Constitution, 228 the Court also explored the nature of eleemosynary

218. Dartmouth was decided in 1819, the same year the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the
restrictive view of charities in Hart's Executors. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodard,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819). As discussed below, however,
Dartmouthestablished the attorney general's monopoly on charitable enforcement. See infra notes
217-42. This feature of charitable enforcement survived into the emergence of the permissive view
of charities announced in 1844 in Vidal. See 43 U.S. 127 (1844); supra notes 172-216 and
accompanying text.
219. See generally KERMIT L. HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 141-42 (2d ed. 1996).
220. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 631.
221. Seeid at 626.
222. Id.
223. See HALL ETAL., supra note 219, at 141-42.

224. See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 624.
225. See HALL ET AL., supra note 219, at 141-42.
226. Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 624.
227. See HALL ETAL., supra note 219, at 141.
228. Specifically, Dartmouth concerned the "Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts"
clause of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art I, § 10, cf. 1; see also Dartmouth, 17 U.S.
at 625.
229. "Eleemosynary" means "[o]f or pertaining to alms or almsgiving; charitable ...
[d]ependent on or supported by alms.... [o]fthe nature of alms; given or done as an act of charity;
gratuitous." THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, VOL. V, at 129 (2d ed. 1989).

CHARITABLE ENFORCEMENT REFORM

corporations and the relationships among their various parties. The Court
noted that, by the terms of incorporation, Dartmouth College was "an
eleemosynary institution, incorporated for the purpose of perpetuating the
application of the bounty of the donors, to the specific objects of that
The Court, however, grappled with the roles,
bounty ....
responsibilities, and duties of the various groups and individuals associated
with the college. 23' The Court noted that "[t]he founders.., have parted
with the property ... , and their representatives have no interest in that
property. The donors of land are equally without interest .... The students
are fluctuating, and no individual . . . has a vested interest in the
institution. ' ' 23 2 Even though the trustees of Dartmouth College were
embroiled in litigation over the amended corporate charter, the Court
maintained that "the trustees ha[d] no beneficial interest to be
protected. 233 Therefore, the Court concluded, the donors and settlors of
the charitable trust did not have any recognized equitable interests because
they were divested of any interest at the moment the charity was created.234
On the other hand, the beneficiaries (i.e., the future students of Dartmouth
College) had no vested interests prior to enrollment. 35 Finally, the Court
reasoned that although the individual trustees were responsible for the
administration of the charitable trust, the trustees "possessed no private,
individual, beneficial interests .... 236
The Court, then, excluded settlors and beneficiaries as potential legally
interested parties in enforcement and administrative issues. 237 Additionally,
the Court excluded trustees when acting in an individual and private
capacity.238 When acting in a collective and fiduciary capacity, however,
the Court found that "the whole legal interest [of a charitable trust] is in
[the] trustees, and can be asserted only by them., 239 As one commentator
noted, Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Dartmouth College "is
important not so much because it decided who can represent the interest
240
of the charitable beneficiaries, but because it decided who cannot.
Although the Court spoke in absolute terms regarding the trustees' role
in charitable enforcement and administration, the Court rooted the
*"M

230. Dartmouth 17 U.S. at 640.
231. See id. at 641-42.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 641.
234. See id. at 643.
235. See id.
236. Id.
237. See id. at 642.
238. See id. at 643.
239. Id. at 645.
240. Mary Grace Blasko et al., StandingtoSuein the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 37,
41(1993).
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trustees' power in an implied contract.24' In the Dartmouth College
context, the contract was between "the donors, the trustees, and the crown
.... ,,242 In a general eleemosynary context, the parties to an implied
charitable trust contract are the settlor, the trustees, and the crown's
successor, the state. With the exclusion of settlors and beneficiaries, the
trustees and the state, acting through the attorney general, remained as the
recognized interested parties in American charitable trust law. Thus,
DartmouthCollege firmly established the attorney general as a recognized
participant in charitable enforcement and as the primary guardian of the
beneficiaries's interests.
B. The ContemporaryRole of the Attorney General
The result of Dartmouth College signaled the beginning of the
contemporary regime of charitable regulation in American law. While the
trustees remain primarily responsible for the administration of charitable
trusts, the attorney general stands ready to challenge the trustees when the
direction of the charity deviates from its purpose, to the detriment of the
intended beneficiaries.243 The modem American attorneys general fulfill
their regulatory duty primarily by invoking the court's equitable powers
of deviation244 and cypres.245 When charitable assets are jeopardized, the
attorney general is empowered to file suit or intervene, petitioning the

241. See Dartmouth, 17 U.S. at 643.
242. Id.
243. See Budig et al., supra note 3, at 108 ("Although the corporate standard is usually applied
to nonprofit directors, it is significant that the attorney general is vested with the power and
discretion to bring suit against directors who do not perform their duties.").
244. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the doctrine of deviation as follows:
The court will direct or permit the trustee to deviate from a term of the trust if it
appears to the court that compliance is impossible or illegal, or that owing to
circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him compliance
would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the purposes of the
trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 381 (1959).

245. The Restatement (Second) of Trusts defines the doctrine of cypres as follows:
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and it
is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
purpose, and if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the
application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general intention of the settlor.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 399 (1959).

CHARITABLE ENFORCEMENT REFORM

court to preserve the charitable character of the property in equity.246
Daloia v. FranciscanHealth System, Inc.247 provides an illustrative
example of the contemporary role of the state attorneys general in the
United States. Daloiaconcerned two charitable trusts established by a pair
of sisters for the benefit of a Catholic medical center. 248 The purpose of the
trusts was for "use among the sick-poor in accordance with the hospital's
mission., 249 The hospital was eventually sold."' The sale, however,
rendered the express terms of the trust impossible to implement. 21'
Accordingly, the trustee sued the hospital-beneficiary to recover the funds
that had been received by the hospital and to redistribute the funds to
alternate beneficiaries. 252 In response, the hospital sought to apply the
funds from the charitable trusts to another Catholic hospital in a nearby
city."' After successfully intervening in the case, the attorney general
argued for the application of both cypres and deviation under the court's
equity powers.25 4 The court ultimately accepted the attorney general's
arguments in favor of the application of deviation to allow the trust funds
to be diverted to the other hospital, finding that "the award of the funds to
[the other hospital]
will not change the settlors' underlying charitable
' 211
objectives.
The Daloiacase demonstrates the results of the historical development
of attorney general enforcement and reflects the modern legacy of Hart's
Executors, Vidal, and DartmouthCollege. First, by invoking the attorney
general's mandatory involvement in the case,256 the court acknowledged
the exclusivity of attorney general enforcement that survives from the preElizabethan era. Contemporary law, therefore, gives modern-day form and
substance to the principles of charitable regulation and the role of the
attorney general espoused in the Dartmouth College decision.
Second, Daloia reaffirms the long-recognized need for a unique
regulatory regime in the eleemosynary context. Although the hospital-

246. See Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 45.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

679 N.E.2d 1084 (Ohio 1997).
See id. at 1089-90.
Id. at 1086.
See id. at 1087.
See id.
See id.
See id.

254. See id. at 1091. But see First Nat'l Bank v. Unknown Heirs ofDonnelly, 122 N.E.2d 672
(Ohio App. 1954) (applying the doctrine of deviation upon the volition of the court without the
involvement of the attorney general).
255. See Daloia, 679 N.E.2d at 1092. The court explained that "[g]iven the change in
circumstances, we believe that a deviation from the express terms of the trust instruments is
appropriate to carry out the settlors' charitable wishes." Id.
256. See id. at 1087 n.4.
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beneficiary in Daloia also argued for the application of cy pres and
deviation,257 its motivations differed significantly from those of the
attorney general. The hospital, like any reasonable corporation, was
undoubtedly loath to part with the income from the trusts. The attorney
general, however, discharged its obligation under the law by seeking
equitable relief on behalf of the ultimate beneficiaries of the charitable
trusts, the people of the state. 5 8 The ultimate beneficiaries of the charity
would not otherwise have been able to participate in the contest over the
funds. Daloia,therefore, acknowledges the attorney general's function of
speaking for those who cannot speak for themselves and echoes the
standing principles espoused in Dartmouth College. This function goes to
the very essence of philanthropy and reflects many of the same regulatory
goals enumerated in the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth. 59
Finally, Daloiaupholds the viability of the permissive view of charities
that prevailed from the Hart's Executors and Vidal debate. The Vidal
decision authoritatively conferred a special status upon charities under
American law. Specifically, charitable trusts are favored under the law and
equity will still step in to preserve and effectuate a settlor's philanthropic
intentions. Under a more intolerant standard, the Daloiatrusts would have
failed once circumstances rendered the express terms of the trust
instruments impossible to implement. Under the permissive Vidal rule,
however, the attorney general has the latitude to seek the modification and
preservation of trusts through the equitable powers of a sympathetic and
responsive judiciary.
VI. CRITICISM AND DEBATE OF THE MODERN ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
ENFORCEMENT OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS

A. Critics of Attorney GeneralEnforcement
The modem form of charitable enforcement by state attorneys general
is not, however, without its critics. A number of commentators have
addressed the issue by exploring the deficiencies in attorney general
enforcement and by offering alternative enforcement regimes.2 60 These
critiques can largely be boiled-down to the assertion that a politically
influenced 26 1 state attorney general suffers from a lack of funds, a lack of

257. See id. at 1087 (noting that the appellees argued that the "funds ... should be distributed
'to St. Elizabeth Medical Center...').
258. See id. at 1087 n.4.
259. See supra note 68.
260. See infra notes 263-80 and accompanying text.
261. Critics allege that the attorney general's oversight of charities is uniquely affected by its
inherent political nature as an elective office. Specifically, such critics assert that political
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staff, and an impossibly overwhelming case load resulting in insufficient
and ineffective regulation of charitable fiduciaries.262 Although there is
considerable overlap, the criticisms of attorney general enforcement
generally fall into four basic categories. Each category is discussed, in
turn, below.
1. The Preclusion of Legitimately Interested Parties
from Correcting Charitable Abuses
As discussed in Section V, charitable enforcement is exclusively within
the authority of the state attorney general. As a result, the public is
precluded from compelling the attorney general's intervention in cases of
misappropriation of charitable assets.2 63 Attorney Mary Frances Budig
explains the problems that result from limited standing: "Despite the
attorney general's monopoly on enforcement, the attorney general cannot
be compelled to bring an action for enforcement .... In practice, the
attorney general's vast authority is seldom used ....In fact, the attorney
general generally avoids taking affirmative action, unless the case involves
dishonesty or extreme imprudence." 2"
Thus, critics argue that the preclusion of other potential charitable
regulators rests on the dubious premise that, in a case of alleged trustee
misconduct, the attorney general is the only party with a legally cognizable
interest in charities sufficient to bring an enforcement action. 265 The
corollary to this premise is that the true party in interest in such cases is the
public at large.266 Therefore, the attorney general, as the legal
representative of the public, is the only party with standing to bring an
enforcement action.267 Reform-minded critics, however, regard this

considerations taint the attorney general's charitable enforcement policy and agenda. Blasko, for
example, notes that attorneys general "may well see no point to a muckraking investigation of
charges against respectable trustees and corporate officers." Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 48
(citing Karst, The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility, 73
HARV. L. REv. 433, 478 (1960)).
262. See id.
263. See Budig et al., supra note 3, at 108-10.
264. Id. at 109-10.
265. See Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 41 (criticizing the reasoning of the Court in
Dartmouth College v. Woodward).
266. See id.at 42.
267. See id. at 41-42. Blasko, et al. explain:
The [Dartmouth College] Court's reasoning ...leads to the conclusion that only
a trustee or the attorney general has an interest that allows a suit. Both judicial and
scholarly commentators have given more pragmatic reasons for the exclusivity of
attorney general enforcement. Observers were concerned that charities would be
embroiled in "vexatious" litigation, constantly harassed by suits brought by parties
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conclusion as narrow and formalistic. 2 6 If the "public" is the true party in
interest in charitable enforcement, they argue, then it stands to reason that
a sufficiently identifiable subset of the "public" can, and perhaps should,
also be recognized as a true party in interest and enjoy standing to enforce
charitable trusts.269
2. The Attorney General is Equipped to Remedy
Only the Most Egregious Violations
This charge is largely a matter of supply and demand. On the demand
side, most states have thousands of charitable trusts and corporations.27 °
Each trust represents a potential for abuse and misappropriation of
charitable assets. Therefore, the demands for investigation and
enforcement are great. On the supply side, the attorney general's resources
are relatively meager. 7' Thus, the attorney general must judiciously and
carefully allocate resources to maximize its regulatory resources. As a
practical matter, then, only abuses that (1) involve high dollar amounts, (2)
receive media attention and notoriety, or (3) involve particularly
reprehensible behavior, are subject to the attorney general's scrutiny.272
3. Infrequent and Arbitrary Enforcement by the Attorney General
Critics generally find infrequent and arbitrary enforcemen
symptomatic of a lack of funds, a lack of interest, or both. Brenda Boykin,
for example, explains that "[limits on the resources of the Attorney
General's office may make it ...unresponsive. Several commentators
have argued that state attorneys general lack both the finances and the

with no stake in the charity.
Id.at 41.
268. See, e.g., id.at 52.
269. See id.
270. See Fishman, supra note 26, at 617-18 (discussing the proliferation of charitable
organizations in the United States); Evelyn Brody, The Limits ofCharity FiduciaryLaw, 57 MD.
L. REV. 1400, 1408 (1998) ("What has undeniably changed, however, is the size and behavior of
the charitable sector itself, and the need of thousands of new charities to reach beyond traditional
populations to staff their boards. Explosive growth and expansion into commercial activities have
transformed the typical charity from a perpetual fund invested by trustees into a modem enterprise
subject to the management demands of a complex operating business.").
271. See Fishman, supra note 26, at 669-70 (describing the general "lack of resources devoted
to monitoring" of charities throughout the various states).
272. See Budig et al., supra note 3,at 109-10; see also Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 39
("Lack of money, coupled with the obligation to discharge the other important duties of the attorney
general's office, contributes to inadequate staffing for the purpose of supervising charities. This
often results in a necessarily selective prosecution of only the most egregious of abuses.").
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incentive to oversee effectively nonprofit corporate managers."' 273
Additionally, Budig notes that "[a]ctual enforcement against charitable
trusts and corporations has been sporadic. The attorney general has many
responsibilities beyond supervising charities and that duty often takes low
priority. ' 274 The essence of this view was perhaps best expressed by the
Delaware Attorney General in Oberly v. KirbyY lamenting that charitable
beneficiaries are forced to rely upon "'the
inclination and budget of a
' 276
public official to vindicate their rights.'
4. Economic Critique
Not surprisingly, Chief Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit
critiques the current supervision of charitable trusts on economic grounds
and dismisses the attorney general's role as "largely formal. 277 Posner
contends that charitable trusts suffer because they are disconnected from
the economic forces that guide the behavior of corporate directors in the
for-profit realm.278 Posner endorses a rule that would require "charitable
foundations to distribute every gift received ...within a specified period

of years. 2 79 He claims such a rule would "give trustees and managers of
charitable foundations an incentive they now lack to conduct a tight
operation.""
B. Defenders of Attorney General Enforcement
Many of the complaints leveled against the current charitable
enforcement regime are creditable and well-reasoned. Nevertheless, there
is evidence to suggest that state attorneys general are at least somewhat
effective in preserving charitable assets and disciplining fiduciaries.28 '
Professor of Law Rob Atkinson, in particular, has noted the positive
273. Note, The Nonprofit Corporation in North Carolina: Recognizing a Right to Member
Derivative Suits, 63 N.C. L. REV. 999, 1009 (1985); see also Fishman, supra note 26, at 669
(discussing the "multiplicity of responsibilities and extremely limited resources" of the attorney
general).
274. Budig et al., supra note 3, at 110; see also Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 39-40
("Attorney General enforcement is problematic on a practical level for several reasons. Given the
current budgetary constraints facing almost all state governments, the effectiveness of attorney
general enforcement is likely to be sporadic, at best.").
275. 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991).
276. Id. at 468 (quoting the Attorney General's Opening Brief at 16).
277. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 484 (3d ed. 1986).
278. See id.; see also Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable
Organizations, 1999 Wis. L. REV. 227 (comparing and contrasting for-profit and nonprofit
corporations).
279. POSNER, supra note 277, at 484.
280. Id.
281. See infra notes 282-91 and accompanying text.
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attributes of exclusive attorney general enforcement as well as deficiencies
in its criticism.282 First, Atkinson points to the "unproven premise," based
on "anecdotal . . horror stories," that charitable enforcement falls far
short of some idealized and hypothetical gold standard of perfect
enforcement.283 Second, in response to the assertion that attorneys general
are too preoccupied with other matters to do a proper job of charitable
enforcement, Atkinson notes that "[o]ther areas arguably need more
attention than charity, and may properly be getting it."28 4
Third, critics who point to the multitude of duties and responsibilities
of the attorney general as a cause of deficient enforcement285 ignore the
fact that most state attorney general offices are compartmentalized into
specialized sections, much like the various practice groups typically found
in larger law firms.286 When considered as a whole, the state attorney
general's office is charged with a plethora of responsibilities.
Nevertheless, specialized and focused units with a high degree of expertise
perform most of the charitable regulation.287 Fourth, critics also tend to
overlook the deterrent effect appurtenant to the existence of regulation and
the threat of enforcement.2 8
Fifth, Atkinson points to "extra-legal methods" of charitable regulation
that operate as a de facto supplement to attorney general enforcement.289
Specifically, charities that squander donations on wasteful or dubious
endeavors risk the loss of future donations as benefactors vote with their
wallets.29 0 Finally, by virtue of the attorney general's monopoly on
enforcement, charities are shielded from the dangers of over-regulation

282. See generally Atkinson, supra note 35.
283. Id. at 683. Atkinson asks rhetorically, "[w]hen proponents of [charitable enforcement
reform] argue that attorneys general are underfunded and understaffed, we have a right to ask, 'In
comparison to what?"' Id.
284. Id. (noting that "I am more disturbed about my wife's grandfather's gold watch being in
the hands of a burglar than I am about some deacon dipping into the collection plate at her ancestral
church.").
285. See, e.g., Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 48 (noting that "[aittorneys general's offices
...
have many pressing concerns aside from charities").
286. See, e.g., STATE OF OHIO ATTORNEY GENERAL BETTY D. MONTGOMERY OFFICE
OVERVIEW. The Office of the Ohio Attorney General, for example, is divided into twenty-six
sections, including a Charitable Law Section which is dedicated in large part to the enforcement
of Ohio's Charitable Trust Act. See id.
287. But see Fishman, supra note 26, at 669 (discussing that, in 1977, while some states
devoted personnel and resources exclusively for charitable enforcement, such states were in the
minority).
288. See Budig et al., supra note 3, at 110 (criticizing attorney general enforcement on the
grounds that "[i]n practice, the attorney general's vast authority is seldom used").
289. See Atkinson, supra note 35, at 684.
290. See id.
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and wasteful litigation.29 '
VII. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
As Section VI demonstrates, the debate over charitable enforcement
reform continues with reasonable arguments on both sides. However, as
with all systems, including enforcement regimes, there is room for
improvement. To this end, a number of commentators have offered
proposals to reform and improve the state of charitable enforcement. Some
of the more notable and intriguing reform proposals are briefly outlined
below.
A. Reforms Based Upon IncreasedStanding
1. Special Interest Doctrine
As with all of the reforms that address the standing issue, the special
interest doctrine seeks to increase the class of those who can enforce a
charity by connecting standing to a more expansive theory or definition.292
The theory at work in the special interest doctrine is the analogy between
private trusts and charitable trusts.293 In a private trust, both trustees and
beneficiaries have standing to enforce. As attorney Mary Grace Blasko
explains, "[c]ourts that allow private [trustees] to sue charities basically
transplant this doctrine of an 'interest' in a trust into the philanthropic
setting."294 The analogy between trustees of private trusts and their
counterparts in charitable trusts is quite clear and obvious. The analogy
between private beneficiaries and charitable beneficiaries, however, is
decidedly more difficult to appreciate as charitable beneficiaries are by

291. See Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 39 (warning against the possibility of "overregulating philanthropy or exposing it to increased litigation .... "); Fishman, supranote 26, at 670
("A more practical reason for denying the public standing is that the persons benefited by charities
are usually members of a large and shifting class of the public. If any member of that class had
standing, the charity would by subjected to much unnecessary litigation."); Note, supra note 273,
at 1011 (cautioning against the potential for "vexatious lawsuit[s]" that could accompany a
departure from exclusive attorney general enforcement of charities).
292. When considering increased standing, Brody warns that advocates of increased standing
impliedly "believe that the gains in preventing charity abuses outweigh the additional cost in
administration, interference in decisionmaking, and the possibility of getting the wrong result."
Brody, supra note 270, at 1431-32. Brody's cautionary stance is well advised as it is an open
question whether the "cure" of expanded standing is better, or worse, than the "disease" of
exclusive attorney general enforcement.
293. See Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 59-60; see also Atkinson, supra note 35, at 664-85
(discussing standing to enforce charities among donors and beneficiaries among various theoretical
models).
294. Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 60.
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necessity an ambiguous and loosely defined group. 295 The special interest
doctrine, however, expands standing to include certain charitable
beneficiaries and "provides access to the courts only to those with a
particularized and justified involvement in the accomplishment of
charitable objectives. 296
In order to decide which beneficiaries have a "special interest" to
justify increased standing, Blasko offers a five-part test. 297 The five
elements of the special interest doctrine include: "(a) the extraordinary
nature of the acts complained of and the remedy sought by the plaintiff; (b)
the presence of fraud or misconduct on the part of the charity or its
directors; (c) the state attorney general's availability or effectiveness; ....
298
(d) the nature of the benefitted class and its relationship to the charityk[;]
and finally, (e) "subjective and case-specific factual circumstances. ' '299
The special interest doctrine accomplishes a number of objectives.
First, it provides the courts with a comprehensive analytical framework in
which to consider increased standing in the charitable enforcement
context. Second, it provides. a sound basis in which to grant standing to
legitimately interested beneficiaries and to deny standing to those who
would merely bring nuisance suits against fiduciaries. As Blasko notes,
"[i]f the private party successfully demonstrates the requisite special
interest in a charity's philanthropic goals, the action is not likely to be
frivolous or needlessly vexatious.""3 ' Finally, increased standing would
augment attorney general enforcement without resulting in overly
burdensome regulation of charitable fiduciaries.30 '
2. Relators
Rather than a truly novel reform, the modem use of relators in the
charitable enforcement context represents the return of an idea that was
used in seventeenth century England.3 2 Modem advocates of relators,
however, avoid the problems that plagued their earlier use. A relator has
been defined as "a party who may or may not have a direct interest in a
transaction, but is permitted to institute a proceeding in the name of the

295. See id.
296. Id. at 61.
297. See id. at 61-78 (describing the five elements and their relationship to one another).
298. Id. at 61.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. ("Correctly applied, the special interest exception creates enforcement opportunities
for private parties, enabling them to act essentially as private attorneys general, while still avoiding
the most important policy pitfalls associated with lax standing rules.").
302. See supranote 78 and accompanying text.
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people when that right to sue resides solely in the attorney general."3"3 The
theoretical basis for the use of relators in the charitable enforcement
context lies in quo warranto proceedings.31 4 Professor of Law James
Fishman notes that courts have granted relator status in the nonprofit
context to "bar associations, taxpayers, cemetery plot holders, directors of
other state departments, and members of a social club."3 5 The use of
relators increases the scope of standing far beyond the attorney general in
jurisdictions that recognize relator actions in charitable enforcement
cases.3" 6 Procedurally' states that have adopted the use of relators in the
charitable context permit relators to "file with the attorney general
informations alleging abuses by charitable organizations. 3 °7 Perhaps the
most intriguing aspect of the use of relators is to allow "the attorney
general to bring suit in absentia - to draw upon private resources for the
conduct of the suit, but simultaneously retain ultimate control of the
proceeding. 3 °8
3. Grantor Enforcement
Much like the use of relators, grantor enforcement is really an old idea
that is experiencing a rebirth. The concept of grantor enforcement is rather
similar to the ancient visitorial rights.3" Grantor enforcement is recognized
in private trusts on three bases. First, grantors may enforce trusts if a
foreseeable economic interest is the subject of the alleged breach of
fiduciary duty.3" ° Second, grantors may enforce trusts where the trustee's
misdeeds result in a substantial departure from the grantor's
expectations. 3 ' Finally, the grantor may act as "a representative of
beneficial interests" to justify an enforcement action." 2 This final basis of
grantor enforcement has been applied to charitable trusts on the theory that
if a grantor can enforce the "beneficial interest" of a private trust, then
there is nothing to prevent the grantor of a charitable trust from doing the

303. Fishman, supra note 26, at 671 (citing Brown v. Memorial Nat'l Home Found., 329 P.2d
118 (Cal. Ct. App.-1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 943 (1959)).
304. See id. at 671-72.
305. Id. at 673.
306. See id. at 673-74.
307. Id.at 673 (describing the use of relators and the accompanying procedure under
California law). Once again, an old idea (informations) is incorporated into a modem reform
proposal. See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
308. Blasko et al.,
supra note 240, at 49.
309. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing visitorial rights).
310. See John T. Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law
Setting, 62 N.C. L. REv. 905, 916-17 (1984).
311. See id. at917.
312. See id.
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B. Reforms ModeledAfter ShareholderDerivativeActions
Where the directors and officers of a for-profit corporation are guilty
of mismanagement, corporate law recognizes the right of a shareholder to
bring an action on behalf of the corporation for redress. 314 The basis of this
right is the fact that for-profit corporations ultimately exist for the benefit
of their shareholders.1 5 When one considers that charitable corporations
exist for the benefit of their beneficiaries, then the analogy between
beneficiaries and shareholders is readily apparent. Thus, the shareholder
derivative suit has been advocated as an obvious model for charitable
enforcement reform.31 6 However, because charitable beneficiaries are
necessarily unidentified, reformers substitute beneficiaries with the next
best group - members of the nonprofit organization acting on behalf of
the beneficiaries.317
Boykin explains how some courts have made the leap of importing the
shareholder derivative suit into the charitable context:
Courts in several jurisdictions.. . have recognized the right
of members to bring derivative suits on behalf of nonprofit
corporations. In most of the decisions, the courts have
reasoned that common-law precedent giving shareholders a
derivative suit right conferred such a right on members of
nonprofit corporations by implication and that this right
continues
until the state's legislature .
expressly denies
3I
it.
it318

The cornerstone of the shareholder derivative suit is the breach of the
duties of care and loyalty. Breach of duty is evaluated in the nonprofit
context in terms of "whether a particular transaction allows the entity's
assets to be used for the charitable purposes ...and serves the best

313. See id.
314. See Blasko et al., supra note 240, at 53.
315. See id.
316. See id. at 54. Blasko explained: "Although members [of charitable corporations] do not
have 'pecuniary interests' ... , it has gradually been recognized that they do have an 'interest' in
the corporation distinct from that of the general public. Since this interest is in some ways
analogous to that of a shareholder in a for-profit corporation, members of nonprofit corporations
often can use derivative suits to enforce the rights and purposes of the organization." Id.; see also
Atkinson, supra note 35, at 670-73 (discussing derivative suits and member standing); Brody, supra
note 270, at 1433-34 (discussing director standing).
317. See Note, supra note 273, at 1004-05.
318. Id.

20001
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interests of the corporation and the community." 3t 9
The shareholder derivative model of charitable enforcement has a
number of advantages. A mature and well-settled body of substantive law
supports shareholder derivative actions. 320 Therefore, unforeseen
difficulties are less likely to undermine the implementation of this type of
reform as compared to more novel reforms. Similarly, the shareholder
derivative procedure is established and generally well-understood by the
practicing bar. Thus, unlike other types of reforms, the shareholder
derivative model is feasible on both a pragmatic and conceptual level.
Finally, like other reforms aimed at increased enforcement standing, the
shareholder derivative model would enhance, strengthen, and supplement
the existing powers of the attorney general.
C. Statutory Supplements to the Attorney
General's Common Law Powers
One of the forces driving charitable enforcement reform is the
confusion caused by the overlap between corporate law and trust law.
Corporate officers find themselves, often unwittingly, embroiled in
charitable trust issues. Conversely, state attorneys general often find
themselves ill equipped in the corporate arena, armed only with charitable
trust law. This phenomenon is perhaps most evident in the nonprofit to forprofit hospital conversion context.3 2 ' A number of hospitals were
originally founded as nonprofit organizations.322 Overtime, these formerly
charitable hospitals became predominantly for-profit.3 23 Nevertheless,
these hospitals continue to retain some measure of charitable assets.32 4
Thus, a nonprofit to for-profit hospital conversion implicates both trust law
and general corporate law.
In an attempt to bring clarity to the overlap of corporate law and trust
3 25
law, some commentators have suggested a combined solution.

319. Naomi Ono, BoardsofDirectorsUnderFire:An Examinationof Nonprofit BoardDuties
in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 130 (1998) (discussing the duties of
care and loyalty in a nonprofit shareholder derivative context).
320. See, e.g., Note, supra note 273, at 1007.
321. See generally Lawrence E. Singer, The Conversion Conundrum: The State and Federal
Responses to Hospitals' Changes in CharitableStatus, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 221 (1997); Note,
Nonprofit Hospital Conversions in Kansas: The Kansas Attorney General Should Regulate All
Nonprofit HospitalSales, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 521 (1999) [hereinafter Kansas Conversions]; Note,
Turning PatientsInto Profit: Nonprofit Hospital Conversions Spur Legislation, 22 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 627 (1998); Craig R. Mayton, The View From Ohio, Mar.-Apr. 1997 HEALTH AFF. 92.
322. See Ono, supra note 319 at 107.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 107-08.
325. See Kansas Conversions, supra note 321, at 562 (discussing a Louisiana statute that
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Specifically, by augmenting the attorney general's common law powers
with statutory guidance, the best elements of both corporate and trust law
can be harnessed.326 This type of reform has been implemented in
Louisiana, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Washington. 27 Advocates claim
that such statutory reforms would: (1) outline requisite disclosures and
duties for directors; (2) provide guidance for decision making and
compliance; (3) ensure fairness by requiring attorney general approval;
and (4) preserve charitable assets without unduly burdening legitimate
business transactions. 28
D. The Internal Revenue Service as a
De Facto Regulator of Charities
Charities, by definition, are non-profit organizations. Consequently,
charities typically qualify for tax exempt status under section 501 (c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code.329 As a result, imprudent charitable fiduciaries
may avoid implicating charitable trust law, but may run afoul of federal
tax law. Thus, the tax collector may operate as a de facto charitable
regulator. 33' This fact is particularly evident in the nonprofit to for-profit
managed care conversion context. Professor of Law Evelyn Brody
explains:

defines the duties of directors and the attorney general in the sale of nonprofit hospitals).
326. See id.
327. See id.at 562 n.237 (discussing nonprofit hospital conversion statutes in New Hampshire,
Ohio, and Washington).
328. See id
329. Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code provides as follows:
List of exempt organizations.-The following organizations are referred to in
subsection (a): (3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its activities
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the
activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.
26 U.S.C. §501(c)(3) (1998). Interestingly, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) reads somewhat like a modem
restatement of the preamble to the Statute of Elizabeth. Compare id., with Stat. 43 Eliz. I, c.4
(1601), supra note 68.
330. See generally Brody, supra note 270, at 1434-40.
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[C]ongressional tax law writers became captivated by the
sorry facts of management buyouts of nonprofit health
maintenance organizations at reportedly phenomenal bargain
prices to the insiders ....
The federal tax rules were helpless
to punish this type of wrongdoing. A charity selling all its
assets and distributing the sales proceeds to other charities in
liquidation doesn't care about losing its tax exemption ....
Reformers sought a legal structure that would penalize the
wrongdoers rather than the injured charity and its
beneficiaries, without imposing an absolute ban on selfdealing.33 '
These reforms, therefore, target charitable fiduciaries that participate in
self-serving transactions.
If such transactions result in financial gain for the fiduciary, at the
expense of the charity, the fiduciary faces a tax penalty.332 Although these
tax consequences are not a true reform in the sense that they are part of an
intentional and comprehensive initiative, the tax laws undeniably operate
to deter fiduciary misconduct.333 More importantly, these tax reforms
demonstrate how the Internal Revenue Service can serendipitously operate
'
as a "uniform, super-regulatory board."334
VIII.

RECONCILING REFORM WITH HISTORY

Reformation of charitable enforcement is inhibited for a variety of
reasons. One obstacle is the close relationship between trust law and
nonprofit corporation law. 35 The current enforcement regime evolved to
address abuses of charitable trusts when charitable trusts were the primary
philanthropic vehicle.336 Nonprofit corporations, however, have joined the
charitable trust as a means to harness charitable giving.3 37 Nevertheless,
the law has lagged behind the rise of the nonprofit corporation and
continues to treat both types of philanthropic arrangements in the same

331. Id. at 1436-37.
332. See id. at 1438. Brody notes that this tax rule is "only the latest in a series of federal tax
laws that impose tighter restrictions on charity behavior than do state rules." Id.
333. See id.
334. Id.at 1439.
335. See Note, supra note 273, at 1001 (explaining that "the law of nonprofit corporations is
considerably less developed than the law of for-profit corporations. This relative lack of
development is due in part to the close relationship between charitable nonprofit corporations and
charitable trusts. Because of the similarities between charitable trusts and charitable corporations,
courts fashioning rules for charitable corporations frequently borrow from the law of trusts . .
336. See id.
337. See id. at 999-1002.
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manner.33 Another impediment to reform is the fact that the majority of
courts view the history and common law tradition of attorney general
enforcement as sufficient reason, by itself, to continue the status quo and
reject reform initiatives.339 Finally, the tradition of charitable enforcement
in America is a victim of history. The United States split from England at
a time when the attorney general was the exclusive guardian of charitable
trusts.340 This exclusivity in England was, however, short lived as statutory
reforms expanded standing. 341' Although England and the United States
share a common legal tradition, the United States retains an enforcement
regime that England abandoned almost two centuries ago.342
Reform, however, makes sense. The case for reform predicated on
increased standing is particularly compelling. Expanded standing
accomplishes a number of laudable policy goals such as (1) recognizing
the reality that other parties, apart from the state attorney general, have a
legitimate stake in charities, (2) bolstering overall enforcement, and (3)
avoiding the pitfalls of over-regulation, such as vexatious and wasteful
litigation.343
Courts and legislatures should not rely on mere history and tradition as
a basis to prevent such innovations. On the contrary, history and tradition
militate in favor of charitable enforcement reform. Charitable enforcement
has always changed to reflect the contemporary needs of society. When
ecclesiastical enforcement became corrupt and ineffectual, the law
changed to provide for chancery enforcement.3 44 Later, when chancery
enforcement was no longer sufficient, commissioners replaced the
Chancellor.3 45 Thus, history suggests that, if the needs of society so
demand, the attorney general's monopoly on enforcement should yield to
reform.
As evidenced by the debate over charitable enforcement reform, it
seems that, once again, society is no longer satisfied with the current state
of the law. 34 6 This dissatisfaction is particularly acute in the nonprofit
hospital conversion context.347 In keeping with the true history and

338. See id. at 1001.
339. The courts are undoubtedly persuaded to maintain the attorney general's monopoly on
enforcement at the behest of the various state attorneys general. See supra notes 243-55 and
accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing, inter alia, Romilly's Act).
343. See supra notes 298-312 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 256-91 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 321-28 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Shelly A. Sackett, Conversion
of Not-For-ProfitHealth Care Providers: A Proposalfor Federal Guidelines on Mandated
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tradition of charitable enforcement law, judges and legislatures should
embrace thoughtful reforms and give such innovations a chance to
succeed. In the end, charitable enforcement and the traditional role of the
state attorney general are neither immutable nor so formidable as to
preclude reform. Thus, statutory and judicial reforms of charitable
enforcement should be encouraged to better serve the needs of
contemporary society.

Charitable Foundations, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 247, 247 (1999).

